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Chapter 8

The United States of Europe

"All the peoples are appearing in the streets of Europe, Each with a little torch in hand – and now we see the fire." – Jean Jaurès

In the summer of 1776 five men came together in a stuffy room above a livery stable in the American city of Philadelphia. Continually irritated by flies, they worked on the text which history would remember as the birth certificate of the United States of America – The Declaration of Independence. Amongst the 75 prominent American citizens who would eventually sign the Declaration could be found such diverse men as future president Thomas Jefferson, the plantation- and slave-owner Thomas Nelson, and the Irish-American businessman Charles Carroll.
The document which was drawn up in Philadelphia begins with the following, famous words:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That to ensure their rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers form are the consent of the governed. That whenever any form of government becomes destructive to these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it. And to institute government, laying its foundation on such principles and organising its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness

It is the wisdom contained in these words which Alistair Cooke, whose renowned series Letter from America has appeared weekly on BBC radio since the war, described in his book Founding Fathers as 'Possibly the most enlightened, certainly the most civilised revolutionaries the world has seen in the past two hunderd years.'

As so much effort has been put into the creation of a United States of Europe, the question arises as to whether history will be so fulsome in its praise of the men (and the most prominent of them are all men) who have given new drive to the European unification project. There are a number of reasons to doubt whether this is so, possibly the most important of which concerns the huge difference in motivation and goals between the Americans and this second generation of European 'Founding Fathers'.
People who were determined took the first step towards European unification in the '40s and '50s that they would never again have to witness the horrors of war. The French pioneers Monet and Schuman hoped that they could lay the ghost of nationalism once and for all, through the establishment of a thoroughgoing system of co-operation between European nations. Their eventual aim was a supranational, federal Europe. Yet however noble their cause, by the 1960s the Cold War and differences in aspiration and interests between western European nations had seen it run aground, with General De Gaulle speaking of a "Europe of the fatherlands".
That European unification has, since the '80s, returned to the agenda can be accredited not only to the fall of the Wall but also to the efforts of that second group of Founding Fathers, the major western European industrialists. Under the presidency of former senior Philips executive Wisse Dekker they gather in conferences of the so-called European Round Table. Amongst them can be found prominent personnel of such multinationals as Siemens, Fiat, Nestlé, Daimler-Benz, Olivetti and Hoffman-la Roche. Together they formulate demands which, in their view, the new Europe must satisfy. If we ever do see a European equivalent of Jefferson's Declaration, then perhaps its opening sentence should read, "We, the major corporations of Europe, hold these truths to be self-evident. That all the good in the world can be attributed to the blessings of the free market, and that all that hinders us in our trade must yield, so that nothing shall stand in the way of the maximum profitability of our enterprises."
Under the influence of these major corporations European integration has taken on new life. If it is the politicians who actually carry out the plans, the influence of multinationals on the headlong harmonisation of Europe's nations has become unmistakable. No more fine ideals, such as those of the American revolutionaries and of the first generation of European 'Founding Fathers', but simply the creation of a 'home market' of 370 million consumers is what provides the motivation for the new 'Europe'.
That economies of scale have their advantages is certain. The questions this chapter will address, however, are these: who profits from this integration? Every one, or merely a small group? Is the integration process about social progress or is it a crowbar for the smashing up of social achievements? Is the nation state at its end or is this merely a convenient conceit that serves certain geo-political and economic interests? Is the desired convergence something that can be imposed, or ought it to grow from below? And isn't there a risk that it will provoke exactly what its original champions feared, a revival of nationalism?

"We will have a liberal Europe, or we won't have Europe at all"

Numerous surveys have demonstrated that, whilst most people in the existing member states accept their countries' membership of the European Union, there is little enthusiasm for further integration. In addition, there is widespread scepticism about and growing opposition to monetary union. Resentment towards the expense and wastefulness of the Common Agricultural Policy; opposition to any further increase of the powers of the European Parliament and other central institutions at the expense of the national authorities; and revulsion at the proposal to establish a European army. What's more, we have yet to see a single demonstration, of more than perhaps a handful of starry-eyed young 'European Federalists', in favour of 'union'. The most widespread feeling, in those countries of northern Europe where the welfare state and social democracy are most highly developed, is anger and frustration at the perceived threat the process of unification poses to national achievements in the area of social policy.
The Euro-federalists have no appreciation of the specific social achievements of countries such as the Netherlands, Sweden or Denmark. For them only one thing counts: the unification of the European market. For decades the slogan of the PvdA, echoed by social-democratic parties in other member states, was "we will have a socialist Europe, or we won't have Europe at all." That was the ideal: international co-operation to mutual advantage, in the interests of peace and progress. Unfortunately, things have turned out rather differently. As VVD leader Fritz Bolkestein said in the summer of 1996, "We will have a liberal Europe, or we won't have Europe at all." And that is the most concise and accurate summary possible of the current European reality.
Immerse yourself in the details of the European unity that is actually being forged (but be warned, this is scarcely an alluring task). You will perceive the vague contours of something bearing a striking resemblance to the spectre that has haunted Europe since the mid-'80s, and which provides the central topic of this book: the spectre of neoliberalism.

The three pillars of 'Europe'

The unification process can be split roughly into three sections. Firstly, economic unification, the so-called Internal Market, and the related goal of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Secondly, a common foreign and security policy, supporters of which would like to see the role of the European Commission, the EU's day-to-day management. Strengthened in these areas and the right of veto for individual member states abolished and replaced by Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), the weighted majority system which is already used in certain policy areas and which relates a country's voting strength to the size of its population. One way of achieving a common security policy would be that suggested by a joint Benelux proposal of 1996, under which the already-existing defence co-operation body, the Western European Union, would become the military arm of the EU. All EU countries would be members and would help finance the system, but they would retain the freedom not to take part in military actions. However, "Countries which do not want to participate (in such actions), may not prevent other countries from doing so, nor hinder the financial solidarity of those who demand common action."
The third pillar concerns policy regarding justice and internal security. Again, supporters wish to increase the power of the European Commission at the expense of that of national governments and parliaments and of the Council of Ministers, the body that directly represents the member states. The idea is that a majority, under QMV, of 70% would henceforward take decisions about how the EU as a whole should operate in this area, which covers such matters as crime, state security, civil rights and immigration.

A-social Europe

The revival of the European idea in the 1980s was, as I have said, due to the desire on the part of international business to create a single European market. It is therefore hardly surprising that economic integration has been the first to make progress, which has been especially the case since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, when borders were removed and a process of liberalisation of people, capital, goods and services set in motion.
In 1989 a Social Charter was drawn up in which the minimum social rights of European citizens were enumerated. However, because this Charter went too far for many member states, all that was agreed at Maastricht was a Social Protocol, under which eleven of the then-twelve member states (the exception being the UK), committed themselves to a limited common social policy.
In the years since, we have been, in the Parliament in The Hague, brought regularly up-to-date with the progress of this policy. The report is invariably a list, delivered in a gloomy tone, of deferred discussions, failures to reach agreement, and proposals mired in the mud.
A typical example is provided by a 1989 (!) proposal concerning the free movement of workers in the EU, which, according to Parliament's official record, "has ended each year in total impasse." One of the few proposals which has been succesful was the call to make 1997 the 'European Year Against Racism', but lack of funding and delays to approval have made this a very low-profile event. Other successful measures under the old social charter were the laying-down of minimum conditions for pregnant workers and the establishment of common rules governing working time, including a maximum working week and minimum paid holidays. In both cases, the measures were so weak and loopholes and exclusions so extensive, that only workers in the UK, who have the least rights of any in the EU, benefited. Worse still, the Working Time Directive was used as an excuse by the Dutch government to harmonise the Netherlands' labour law downwards.
Only two measures have so far been successfully negotiated under the Social Protocol. Workers in major multinational corporations now have the right to be consulted and informed, through European Works Councils, about vital company decisions affecting their future. Employees at Renault, Vilvoorde in Belgium, which was closed without any such consultation, will tell you how valuable and well respected is this right. In addition, under the Protocol procedure which allows the so-called 'social partners' to negotiate EU-wide agreements which can then be made binding by the Council of Ministers, minimum conditions for parental leave will soon be written into EU law.

The scourge of EMU

As the crowning achievement of economic integration EMU must, of course, be established at the turn of the century. In 1998 a decision is scheduled to be taken as to which countries may join when EMU is instituted the following year. The common currency, the euro will replace the old national currencies of participating countries by 2002. It is this part of the process of European unification that currently casts a long shadow over the national politics of almost every EU country.
In order to make EMU strong and the euro a hard currency, European leaders have imposed very harsh conditions on the financial policies of the countries seeking to join. Most importantly, no national debt may amount to more than 60% of GDP, unless it is moving at an acceptable pace towards that level; and the annual budgetary deficit must not exceed 3% of GDP. As early as 1992, Dutch economics professor Arjo Klamer predicted what the consequences would be for his country:

In the first place social security spending will have to be reduced. As things stand we can allow ourselves to make a fuss about a percentage point more or less on unemployment benefit. If the Netherlands wants to satisfy the conditions of the European Monetary Union by the target date of 1997, then government spending will have to be drastically reduced; in that case social benefits will be irrevocably lowered by far larger percentages.

The full scale attack on social security that has been evident since the beginning of the '90s, and not only in the Netherlands, has proved him right. By continuing in its present course the Netherlands will probably meet the EMU criteria. At this stage it is impossible to say who else will qualify, as the criteria are being interpreted more or less flexibly in relation to different countries according to how essential their membership in the first round is regarded. And according to who has the upper hand in the struggle between those who favour a strict adherence to and those who want a looser interpretation of the conditions laid down in the Treaty.
Budget shortfalls and national debts can be addressed in two ways: through increasing the revenue of the state by raising additional moneys through taxation, or by reducing spending. Given the neoliberal fever that has the whole western world in its grasp, it is not surprising that the former of these options has found little favour. Everywhere social security and other collective provisions are being attacked. This is, for the neoliberals, turning bad luck into good, of course, because it gives them a fine excuse to undermine the welfare state in favour of 'individual responsibility.'
In France the government's proposals led in December 1995 to the most widespread and bitter social unrest since 1968. Two months later, in Germany similar plans provoked the biggest demonstrations since World War Two; but neither French Premier Juppé nor German Chancellor Kohl were in any mood to give way to pressure from their countries' citizens. They had eyes only for the EMU criteria. The DM 50 billion by which the German government is seeking to reduce its expenses will come from a lowering of sickness and holiday pay, the raising of the age at which people qualify for pension, and a weakening of the rules protecting civil servants from dismissal. The French government's guns were equally turned on social provisions such as pensions, unemployment benefits and health care.
The picture is similar in Italy, whose debt in 1995 stood at 125% of GDP, more than half the permitted level, Belgium (135%) and Greece (115%). Everywhere in Europe governments are obliged to tie themselves in knots in order to meet the EMU criteria, and everywhere it is the most vulnerable who must foot the bill, because the neoliberals refuse to raise money from the most obvious source, from rich individuals and even richer corporations.
The refrain, especially from social democrats – who were in some cases embarrassed to find themselves supporting a process which relied on the dismantling of their parties' most singular achievements – was that all of this was temporarily necessary in order that European economies might achieve 'convergence'. Thereby making possible an economic and monetary union whose benefits would very quickly outweigh the short-term disadvantages imposed by this necessity. This pretence disappeared early in 1997 when the member states agreed the outlines of a post-EMU 'stability pact', the aim of which is to impose a permanent budgetary discipline on member states and whose terms are, if anything, even harsher than the EMU criteria. States whose governments or monetary authorities do not toe the line will become liable to enormous fines. The stability pact, unlike the EMU criteria, is intended to be permanent and irrevocable. It will outlaw the most mildly progressive centre-left reformism for ever and ever amen. We will have not only a liberal but an a-social Europe, or no Europe at all.

Long live the passport and the bureau d'échange!

As I have already noted, the ideal of a united Europe seems to hold little attraction for the average European. Turnouts for elections to the European Parliament are invariably much lower than those for national elections and have actually fallen, not risen, as European integration has proceeded. The most obvious explanation for this is that for many 'Europe' has become associated with inefficiency, bureaucracy, fraud and, above all, with the kind of declining social standards outlined above. But there is more to it than that.
Much of the propaganda coming out of the EU and its supporters amounts to an attempt to impose a 'European' identity on people where, in reality, none exists. This is why it has consistently failed, and will continue to do so. People feel themselves primarily to be Dutch, or Italian, or French, secondly perhaps Friesian or Catalan, but certainly not European – unless perhaps they are in the United States and meet someone who has no idea where the Netherlands, Belgium or Portugal is.
Europe is not a nation people can identify with, a place where they feel themselves to be understood. It is a geographical abstraction. There is no European people, no European language, no European culture. Certainly, there exists a European history, one marked in this century alone by two major wars. In that sense there is a Europe that demands above anything else that we must create the conditions in which we can live together in peace and co-operation. But that is something very different from denying the existence of the nation state as an expression of a real sense of commonality. The nation state is certainly not destined to last forever, just as the city states which preceded it did not, but it would be going much too far to assert that it should be offered up on the chopping block to serve the global economic interests of European business.
To assert that people who are sceptical in the face of the 'European' failure to appreciate the importance of national identity are by definition nationalists is dangerous nonsense. Certainly socialists – internationalists before we are anything else – can feel confident in rejecting such an accusation. What this discussion raises, however, is the paramount need for realism in the face of an 'idealism' that has now been called into the service of market fundamentalism. Practical democracy is organically bound to the nation state, and it is on the level of the nation state that its battles are fought, just as they are in the case of such things as social rights and social security. Very few people feel a lump in the throat at the sight of the blue flag with its golden stars. This is not something to rejoice over, but a simple statement of fact. The advocates of a European federalism are oblivious to this reality and the results of this are fraught with danger.
Does 'Europe' then have nothing whatsoever to offer its citizens? Ask a 'europhiles' and you will almost certainly hear how wonderful it is to be able to travel around Europe with no passport (which is already true, though only for the Schengen countries), and that you will soon have no need to change your money when going on holiday. An over-zealous eurocrat once calculated that if you left home with £100 and visited every member state of the Union, changing your money in every one, when you got home you'd have only £12 left. It must be obvious, however, that only a complete idiot would do such a thing.
The disadvantages of the removal of borders and of the loss of our national currencies are considerable. Firstly, as was widely predicted, the removal of the borders between the Schengen countries has led to an increase in trans-frontier criminal activities. In order to make up for the loss, moreover, customs and immigration authorities now work through 'flying squads' which operate close behind these borders. In the Netherlands, where identity cards are not obligatory, citizens must now carry valid proof of identity on certain occasions, for example at work, when using public transport and when taking part in public demonstrations. In practice this means that Dutch people from ethnic minorities are asked, in all places and at all times, to show their identity cards. Black and Asian people who live in Britain, almost all of whom are citizens of the U.K., have also discovered that the new, frontier-free Europe can be a very unwelcoming place policed by people who believe that all real Englishmen and Englishwomen have mousy hair, bluish eyes and a furled umbrella under one arm. In Germany, immigrant communities have accused the police of using the removal of borders as an excuse to step up surveillance and harassment of workplaces, social clubs and other places where guest-workers gather. Apart from reminding us that a 'European' identity can be exclusive as easily as it can be 'internationalist', is all of this outweighed in importance by the fact that once a year we can go over the border without having to show our passports?
The loss of national currencies is also far from being an unalloyed delight. This goes far beyond any sentimental attachment to one's own banknotes. Rather more important is the loss by nations of sovereignty over monetary matters. Control of the money supply, the fixing of interest rates and inflation targets, the whole range of macro-economic policies will be transferred from democratically-elected governments, or at worst from banks which are answerable to them, to the European Central Bank in Frankfurt. The ECB will be fully independent of the European 'government' in whatever form it eventually takes. Some would have us believe that monetary policy is apolitical, but this is nonsense. Monetary conditions of course affect the economy, and under EMU they will be absolutely controlled by a central bank whose members will in no sense be representative of the peoples of the European Union.
It has always, amongst others, been the French who have insisted on monetary union. German support came only after they had specified the conditions under which they were prepared to give up the D-Mark, symbol of wirtschaftswunder. They want something in return for their 'investment', namely a political union in which a leading role is automatically reserved for them. In the monetary and economic fields Germany already dominates Europe, and a European political union will do nothing to change that.

Prodigal Europe

It is well understood that a true internal market in which all participants enjoy the same rights must take action, so far as is possible, against unfair competition. Yet if French firms can make Edam cheese and Dutch cheese-makers are allowed to make Danish Blue, then someone has to define what Edam actually is and when Danish Blue is Danish enough to be allowed to bear the name. Before you know it, this simple need leads to the creation of a horrifying bureaucracy to supply definitions of goods for producer and consumer, a bureaucracy out of which no-one can find their way.
This is precisely what we can see happening now. Despite difficult words like 'subsidiarity' and 'proportionality', 'Europe' is sucking in competence like a black hole sucks in matter. This leads unavoidably to excesses, such as the hoo-ha about the European standard for condoms; but there are far more serious examples of 'European' meddling ways and waste.
Since the European Commission concerns itself with financial help to what it terms 'less-favoured regions', it can happen that local authorities from different parts of the same country are forced to bid against each other to show who has the worst slums within their borders. The prize for the winner being an appointment with the Brussels honey pot. However, the biggest winners in the game of Euro-subsidies are not local or regional authorities but – and this is neither surprising nor coincidental – the same multinational corporations which have exerted so much pressure for the realisation of European Union. The last few years have seen an army of professional lobbyists descend on Brussels intent on acquiring Euro-subsidies for their clients. The European Union budget for 1996 amounted to well over £60 billion. A major slice of this goes to Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland, the poor brothers of the Union. This buys the well-off countries free access to both their markets and their cheaper labour, increasing both the influence and the sales of their major firms. The carmakers Volkswagen and Ford have both built new factories in the Portugese capital of Lisbon. In exchange for 4,600 jobs they received around £600 million in European subsidies, plus the trifling sum of £60 million for training new workers. Meanwhile, in its German base at Wolfsburg VW gets on with sacking workers.
Electronics giants such as Olivetti, Philips and Bull have raked in billions of pounds in European subsidies over the last few years in order to enable them to keep abreast with American and Japanese competitors. In this way the costs of development and research are milked from European taxpayers. Extracting gold from the European lodestone has become so profitable that firms like Siemens employ special prospectors to track it down; and there are private consultants staffed by ex-eurocrats who use their knowledge of the funds to the advantage of their clients.
No wonder that the European Court of Auditors year in year out produces crushing reports about the spending practices of the Union's institutions. The German representative on the Court estimated in 1995 that only 20% of the funds disbursed via the so-called structural funds actually furthered the funds' stated ends. What this means is that a cool £13 billion or so was thrown away. Part of it disappeared through fraud, but most was spent on useless projects. Such as a road in an utterly depopulated area of Sicily, factory units in a part of Ireland where no-one had any interest in using them to make up for cuts in funding from their own national government.

Undemocratic Europe

Friend and foe of 'Europe' agree that the present structure of the Union is hardly democratic, as well as that it is overly bureaucratic and obscure in its workings. The strongest institution, the European Commission, takes little notice of the only democratically elected body, the European Parliament. There is, in addition, widespread concern about the growing influence on policy of non-elected officials. As a Dutch diplomat in Brussels recently put it, "In practice it is often the officials who take decisions which the politicians rubberstamp, ratifying them as a formality and without any debate."
From this concern has come growing pressure to widen the competence of the European Parliament and improve decision-making procedures. Yet even the most radical reform will not make the European Union as democratic as the present nation-states of which it is formed, in which moreover the problem of legitimacy and credibility is already great enough. It is inconceivable that the democratic deficit, as it is termed, which has grown in the first place through removing competence from national governments and parliaments, can ever be closed by the institution of a European government or by reform of the European Parliament. European integration increases not only the physical distance between administration and citizen, but also the psychological distance and consequently popular control. Democracy is always allied to a positive unity – objectively present and subjectively experienced – of identity.
While in countries such as Norway, Denmark and France citizens can express their feelings about Europe through referenda, in others, including the Netherlands, such a process of popular consultation is unprecedented. Yet at each step of integration – accession itself, the Single European Act, Maastricht and 'Maastricht 2' – the people of the different member states have had foisted upon them constitutional changes as great in their implications as, for example, the unification of Italy, the independence of Ireland, or the establishment of our own constitution in the Netherlands in 1848. In every country, powers vested in parliament or other national bodies are being handed over to the central institutions of the Union, yet in only some of them do the people have the right to give or withhold their consent.
Jacques Delors, former president of the European Commission, predicted several years ago that within the foreseeable future a majority of national laws would be based on EU rules. He was right, but he did not go far enough. The EU, in addition, provides politicians with a good alibi when they want to do something they know will be unpopular. Benefits must be cut in order to satisfy the EMU criteria, wages forced down to keep the economy 'competitive' in the single European market, environmental laws weakened in the name of fair trade... but none of this is our fault, it's EU law. True enough, but the Union's laws have been made with the full and enthusiastic co-operation of those same neoliberal politicians who, whatever party label they may wear, currently rule almost every member state.

Towards another Europe

It is still not clear how far integration, or 'deepening' as it is known in the jargon, will eventually go. It is also difficult to say just how enlargement in central and Eastern Europe will proceed. Will there be a 'multi-speed' Europe? Will the Netherlands, for example, be allowed to keep its unique policy on drugs, or the Danes and Swedes their higher taxes on alcoholic drinks, the British their equally high tobacco duties? What will happen in relation to the human rights situation in Turkey, the aspirant member state which already enjoys (or rather suffers from) a customs union with the EU? Before such questions are answered years of negotiations will be needed. Whatever the eventual answers, however, one thing is certain: the present neo-liberal officeholders of Europe will continue to cling desperately to the idea that big is beautiful. Just as big firms are considered to be better equipped to deal with international competition, so Europe's countries must be merged into one great whole if they are to be able to match the economic might of the US and the Asiatic tigers. "Look out for the tigers! Prepare yourselves for globalisation because the world is becoming a village."
In the next chapter I will look at the question of whether these arguments are valid. It is time, whatever the answer, that opponents of European integration organised themselves. The point of no return has almost been achieved. Discussions about Europe must move beyond the meeting rooms and plenary chambers of parliaments and other august bodies and into works canteens, cafés and schools. A unified Europe may seem a beautiful idea to the federalists as they sing the closing chorus of Beethoven's Ninth, but the reality is ugly and false. Their distortion of the meaning of Schiller's words Alle Menschen werden Brüder sits uneasily with a system that has led to employees in the Dutch horticultural sector being undercut by unemployed Irish workers. Or jobs in the German building trade being given to English, Spanish and Portuguese workers because they will accept lower rates of pay.
Of course socialists are not opposed to European co-operation, or even to the creation of institutions to embody and further such co-operation. But the formation of an economic and monetary union should be the culmination of a process of unification-from-below, and not, as now, a strait-jacket imposed from above and with no significant degree of popular support. Anyone who regards the world not as a battlefield on which a small number of economic power-blocks struggle to the death, but rather as a motley collection of countries, peoples and cultures, will seek a very different form of European unity. One in which, for instance, national television services cannot be destroyed by the likes of Berlusconi or Murdoch. Where small-scale public transport networks count for more than megalomaniac projects like the HSTs; where the social and cultural achievements of other peoples are respected, rather than offered up as victims to a competitive struggle which spares nothing and no-one, and a vague ideal of a harmonised 'Europe'.
Why are financial demands made on countries seeking to join EMU, but none that are social or ecological in content? The answer is simple: the latter are outlawed by a neoliberal dogma which will allow nothing to stand in the way of the invisible hand of the free market. Why must national governments and parliaments be denied the right to pursue their own foreign, domestic or judicial policies rather than giving precedence to the interests of the Union as a whole, or, to be more precise, the big member states?
Those who ignore the unease of large sections of our populations at the attacks on their living standards launched in the name of "Europe', or the violence done to people's sense of national identity by the handing over of ever more national powers to a supranational institution, should not be surprised when nationalistic sentiments gain strength in reaction. Nor when the extreme right attempts to exploit these feelings, transforming them into xenophobia. The recent history of the Balkans shows what a dangerous chemical reaction this can produce.
We must, in other words, have a Europe that is more careful in the face of such dangers, or we won't have a Europe at all.

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“Enough” Contents:

• Index
• Preface
• Introduction
• Chapter 1 The wondrous rebirth of liberalism
• Chapter 2 The death of social democracy
• Chapter 3 The disempowerment of the people
• Chapter 4 Poverty in the midst of plenty
• Chapter 5 The assault of the market
• Chapter 6 The unbearable lightness of commerce
• Chapter 7 A question of civilisation
• Chapter 8 The United States of Europe
• Chapter 9 The spectre of the world market
• Chapter 10 The inevitability of an alternative
• Preface to the 2006 - updated edition
• Chapter 11 Ten years later, in the Netherlands
• Chapter 12 2006: Another world is possible
• Chapter 13 New optimism